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AbstractThe TLS protocol is the primary technology 
used for securing web transactions. It is based on X.509 
certificates that are used for binding the identity of web 
servers owners to their public keys. Web browsers perform 
the validation of X.509 certificates on behalf of web users. 
Our previous research in 2009 showed that the validation 
process of web browsers is inconsistent and flawed. We 
showed how this situation might have a negative impact on 
web users. From 2009 until now, many new X.509 related 
standards have been created or updated. In this paper, we 
performed an increased set of experiments over our 2009 
study in order to highlight the improvements and/or 
regressions in web browsers behaviours.   
KeywordsX.509 Certificate; Certificate Validation; Web 
browsers 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is the primary 
technology used to secure web communications. Before 
setting up a TLS connection, web browsers have to validate 
the TLS certificate of the web server in order to ensure that 
users are accessing the expected web site. When the web 
browser displays a small padlock, the user can continue 
his/her navigation of the distant web site with the 
knowledge that the web site is who it says it is (if the user 
pays attention to this [1,19]). However, if the web browser 
detects a problem with the certificate, a warning message 
informs the user about this, and the necessity to stop the 
transaction immediately. In this way, the web browser 
protects its users from potentially harmful web sites.  
Theoretically then, things are relatively simple. But in 
practice, things are much more complicated than this. For 
example, on 15 December 2016, around 8am, one of the 
authors connected to the website of COMPSAC 2017 in 
order to submit this paper. However, the connection was not 
possible because the web browser (Firefox) detected an 
error when validating the website’s certificate. Figure 1 is 
the screenshot of the error message (in English this is “An 
error happened when connecting to compsac.info. The 
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) response 
contains out-dated information”). It was not possible to 
submit the paper since Firefox blocked the access without 
any obvious way to bypass its protection system. 
Immediately, the author tried to connect to the same 
submission website using Safari. This time, no error 
message appeared (Figure 2) and the paper was successfully 
submitted. A second test with Firefox was then performed 
but the Figure 1 error message was still displayed. Was the 
paper securely submitted to the correct website or not? 
In 2009, we highlighted the different behaviours of 
several web browsers (Internet Explorer (IE), Opera and 
Firefox) when validating certificates [2]. We explained the 
reasons for these differences were either due to violation of 
the standards by the browsers, or ambiguity in the standards 
themselves.  
 
Fig. 1. Screenshot when opening the COMPSAC 2017 submission web 
site using Firefox 
 
Fig. 2. Screenshot when opening the COMPSAC 2017 submission 
website using Safari 
In this paper, we have performed an increased set of 
tests from [2] and this time we have covered a greater 
number of web browsers (IE, Edge, Opera, Firefox, Safari 
and Chrome), as well as covering the newest standards. Our 
work describes the quality of X.509 certificate validation 
implemented by these web browsers, as well as showing 
their evolution since 2009. Also, we have produced new 
tests for analysing how web browsers implement the OCSP 
protocol. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
overviews the base set of standards related to X.509 
certificates. Section 3 exposes and analyses the results of 
tests executed on six web browsers and describes why their 
behaviours are inconsistent. Finally, in section 4 we 
conclude. 
II. STANDARDS RELATED TO X.509 CERTIFICATES 
The contents and processing of X.509 public key 
certificates (PKCs) are regulated through numerous 
standards documents. They were first officially described in 
the X.509 standard developed jointly by the ISO and ITU-T 
[3]. X.509 provides the general framework for public key 
infrastructures. This document defines the syntax of PKCs 
and revocation lists, as well as how they can be extended 
(by literally anyone). Each standard certificate field has its 
own syntax and semantics as well as constraints on its 
possible values. In many cases a field can have different 
syntax choices. These fields provide information about the 
certificate version number, the subject of the certificate, the 
public key, the way the key can be used, and the certificate 
life cycle management process (Figure 3).  
 
 
Fig. 3. Certificate contents (inspired by [20]) 
Three kinds of field exist: mandatory fields, optional 
fields and extensions (which are all optional). When a field 
is mandatory, Certificate Authorities (CAs) must fill it and 
Relying Parties (RPs) must check it when validating 
certificates. Extensions can be marked as critical or not. If 
present and marked critical, the RP must obey its contents 
or reject the certificate. If marked not critical, the RP can 
ignore the extension if it does not recognise it, but must 
obey it otherwise i.e. it should not ignore a non-critical 
extension that it supports.  
The complexity of the X.509 standard, in terms of fields 
that are mandatory, optional, choices, and extensions, 
means that it is almost impossible for two different 
implementers to produce interworking code. A PKC 
produced by one implementer cannot always be fully 
validated by another, and vice versa. 
Consequently the IETF PKIX group developed an 
X.509 standard profile (RFC 5280) to address the specific 
needs for using PKIs on the Internet. Especially, the profile 
eliminates most options, make choices where several are 
available, and specifies which extensions should be used. 
However, due to the large constituency of the IETF, many 
different authors proposed many different extensions and 
ways of using X.509 certificates, so that by now, over 50 
PKIX specified RFCs exist. One can easily see why it is 
still not a trivial task to implement a fully conformant web 
browser. 
Among all the certificate extensions defined in X.509 
and RFC 5280, Internet applications (such as web browsers) 
must at least be able to recognize: basic constraints, 
certificate policies, policy constraints, subject alternative 
name, key usage, name constraints, extended key usage and 
inhibit any-policy extensions; but do not need to recognize: 
authority and subject key identifiers, and policy mapping 
extensions [4]. 
Other important standards related to X.509 PKCs are: 
• RFC 6125: this explains the rules that must be 
followed in representing and verifying the identity 
of servers identified in the PKCs, 
• RFC 6960: this specifies the OCSP protocol used 
for checking a PKC’s status.  
• RFC 5019:  this addresses the scalability issues 
related to the deployment of OCSP servers in high-
volume environments. It also specifies the rules to 
follow for caching OCSP responses. 
Other standards will be mentioned in the rest of the 
paper at the appropriate point. 
III. ANALYSIS OF WEB BROWSERS’ BEHAVIOR 
In 2009, we tested three web browsers: IE 7, Firefox 3 
and Opera 9.5. In the current research, we tested the latest 
versions: IE 11, Firefox 50 (FF50) and Opera 42 (OP42). 
This allows us to analyse the evolution of their PKC 
validation processes. We also evaluated three new major 
web browsers: Microsoft Edge 38 (ED38), Google Chrome 
55 (GC55) and Safari 10 (SA10). These are preceded with 
an asterisk (*) in the table of results to highlight that they 
were not included in the 2009 study.  
Since our goal is to understand the exact certificate 
validation processes performed by web browsers when 
initiating TLS secured communications, we tested their 
responses when they were confronted with chosen test 
values in specific certificate fields. The results were then 
analysed and compared to the expected behaviour described 
in the relative standards. 
Because we want to examine the evolution of PKC 
validation practices, we performed the same tests as in 2009 
and added new test cases about the subject field and key 
usage extension. These new tests are preceded with an 
asterisk (*) in the table of results. 
When handling TLS certificates, web browsers return 
one of three possible responses, denoted as follows: 
• A: accept the certificate without any intervention by 
the user, 
• W: inform the user about the existence of a problem 
by showing a warning message and asking him/her 
to take a decision, 
• R: refuse the certificate and prohibit access to the 
web server without any intervention by the user. 
To easily identify the evolution of web browsers’ 
behaviour compared to the study of 2009, we use the 
symbol Ô whenever the evolution is considered a 
regression and the symbol Ò whenever the change is an 
improvement. In addition, we highlight the results that are 
not conformant to standards by colouring the cells in grey. 
Our technical test environment is as follows: OP42, 
GC55, FF50 and SA10 are deployed on Mac OSX Sierra; 
IE11, ED38 are deployed on Windows 10; our Web server 
is Apache/2.4.18 and is installed on an Ubuntu Server 
16.04.1 LTS. We generated all the test certificates using 
OpenSSL 1.0.2. 
A. TLS Certificate Subject 
The TLS certificate subject represents the identity of the 
web server. This may be either a Fully Qualified Domain 
Name (FQDN) or an IP address or both. FQDNs and IP 
addresses are different types of name (called name forms in 
the standards). A web server could hold many FQDNs that 
all point to the same IP address, e.g. as in virtual hosting. 
Conversely, one FQDN may point to different IP addresses 
(e.g. for load balancing). 
1) What do the standards state about the subject? 
  
The X.509 standard [3] states that the subject field 
identifies the entity associated with the public-key found in 
the subject public key field. An entity could have one or 
more alternative names, of different types (or forms), held 
in the subjectAltName extension. According to the X.509 
standard, an implementation that supports this extension is 
not required to process all the name types. If the extension 
is flagged critical, at least one of the name types that is 
present must be recognized and processed, otherwise the 
certificate must be considered invalid.  
RFC 5280 [4] states that the subject name may be 
carried in the subject field and/or the subjectAltName 
extension. If the subject naming information is present only 
in the subjectAltName extension, then the subject name 
should be empty and the subjectAltName extension must be 
marked critical. According to this statement a TLS 
certificate can hold multiple names in a combination of the 
Subject field (CN component) and the SubjectAltName 
extension. These names must all refer to the same entity, 
although a browser need not recognize all the different 
name types. 
2) Test and Results 
We performed two types of experiments to test 
certificates holding the FQDN and IP names separately, as 
well as both types together.  
In the first set of experiments, we tested how the web 
browsers reacted when the certificate contains zero, one or 
more FQDN names. We configured our web server to 
respond to requests sent to either www.server1.com (S1) or 
www.server2.com (S2). As the names could be mentioned 
in either or both of the Subject Name-Common Name 
(SCN) and SubjectAltName-DNS Name (SAN-DNS) fields, 
we tested the following different combinations of names in 
our web server certificate: 
1. SCN=www.server1.com,  
SAN-DNS=www.server2.com 
2. SCN=null, SAN-DNS=www.server2.com 
3. SCN=www.server1.com, no SAN-DNS field 
4. SCN=null, no SAN-DNS field 
5. SCN=null, SAN-DNS=www.server1.com and 
www.server2.com. 
For each combination, we recorded the reaction of each 
web browser when accessing www.server1.com and 
www.server2.com (Table I). We also state whether the 
certificate is Valid (V) or Invalid (I) according to the X.509 
standard, RFC 5280 [4] and RFC 6125 [5]. Because we 
obtained the same results when the SubjectAltName 
extension was marked critical or not, we haven’t indicated 
this in Table I. The expected results would be that Valid 
PKCs are Accepted, and Invalid PKCs are either Refused or 
a Warning given. All browsers behaved as expected. 
In the second set of experiments, we tested how the 
browsers reacted when accessing either www.server1.com 
or IP address 192.168.57.2 when:  i) an IP address only, or 
ii) iii) an IP address and a FQDN, or iv) a FDQN only, or v) 
neither, are used in the PKC to identify the web server. In 
all cases except ii) the SCN field was null. With regard to 
the study of 2009, test ii) is a new test case in which the 
SCN field is set to www.server1.com and its IP address is 
set in the IP component of the subjectAltName. All 
browsers behaved as expected, except for test ii) (see 
below). We obtained the same results when the 
subjectAltName was marked critical or not, so we have not 
shown these results in Table II. 
3) Analysis of the Results  
The primary objective of an X.509 PKC is to bind an 
identity to a public key. In the case of a web server, the 
identity is either a FQDN name or an IP address. When the 
identity of the server is null (Table I iv) Table II v)) the 
browser cannot authenticate the server, so the TLS 
certificate is invalid. Whether a browser should 
immediately refuse an invalid certificate (R) or ask the user 
what to do (W) is partly a usability issue and partly a 
security issue. But it is not a standard’s issue. The standards 
will only give guidance on whether a certificate is invalid or 
not, but will not advise a RP what to do with it. From a 
security perspective, if the browser (the RP) cannot 
authenticate the web server, the certificate should be 
rejected (R). From a usability perspective the user could be 
given a choice (W), although in practice most users simply 
click OK to all the pop up windows so invalid certificates 
end up being accepted. RFC 5280 mandates that the IP 
address if present must contain either four (for IPv4) or 
sixteen (for IPv6) octets, and that the FQDN if present must 
not be null. So the Table II v) certificate is clearly invalid. 
But none of the browsers rejected it. Instead they ask the 
user what to do. It should be noted that the way the web 
browsers present the warning message is different. Some 
warnings are more difficult to ignore than others. In the case 
of Safari, ignoring a warning message requires one action 
(click on “Continue”) whereas with GC55 it requires two 
actions (click on “Advanced” then on “Proceed to …”).   
If the standards are not clear about a certificate’s 
validity, this can lead to web browser implementers holding 
different interpretations of this. In the study of 2009, we 
raised one ambiguity about the validity of a certificate that 
holds two FQDNs: one in the SCN field and the other in the 
SAN-DNS extension (Table I i)). The behaviour of the 
tested web browsers was different. IE7 and FF3 treated the 
certificate as invalid, whilst OP9 treated it as valid. To cope 
with this issue, a new RFC (RFC 6125 [5]) was issued in 
2011 to handle the ambiguity. The most important 
recommendations are summarised as follows [5]: 
• Move away from including and checking strings that 
look like domain names in the subject’s Common 
Name. 
• Move toward including and checking DNS domain 
names via the subjectAlternativeName extension 
designed for that purpose: dNSName. 
TABLE I.  MULTIPLE FQDN WEB SERVER IDENTITIES  
 
TABLE II.  IP ADDRESS SERVER AND/OR FQDN IDENTITIES  
 
 
However, this RFC doesn’t invalidate completely the 
setting of DNS names in the SCN field as it states: “In 
general, this specification recommends and prefers use of 
subjectAltName entries (DNS-ID, SRV-ID, URI-ID, etc.) 
over use of the subject field (CN-ID) where possible..  
However, specifications that reuse this one can legitimately 
encourage continued support for the CN-ID [SCN] 
identifier type if they have good reasons to do so, such as 
backward compatibility with deployed infrastructure” 
According to the same RFC, if the DNS name is set in 
both the SCN field and the SAN-DNS, the certificate must 
be treated as invalid if the user tries to access a web server 
using the DNS name present in the SCN field: “A client 
MUST NOT seek a match for a reference identifier of CN-
ID if the presented identifiers include a DNS-ID, SRV-ID, 
URI-ID, or any application-specific identifier types 
supported by the client”. 
Thanks to this clarification of the standards, the 
behaviour of web browsers has now become conformant. 
All of them show a warning message to web users 
whenever they try to access a web server using the DNS 
name contained in the SCN field and in the presence of a 
different DNS name in the SAN-DNS field.  
[4] says that web browsers must “recognize” the SAN 
extension, but only that “all parts of the subject alternative 
name MUST be verified by the CA”. This does not place any 
requirements on the web browser to do likewise. Similarly 
[3] states “An implementation is not required to be able to 
process all name forms”. So browsers do not have to 
support SAN-IP. 
In 2009, IE7 and OP9 didn’t support SAN-IP, so they 
didn’t recognise the IP name of the server. FF3 on the other 
hand did support the IP name form and so did recognise the 
server’s name. Today, however, all the tested web browsers 
support the SAN-IP. All of them accept a PKC with the 
correct SAN-IP whenever the web user accesses the web 
server by its IP address. However, we have found a new 
ambiguity in the standards about the validity of a certificate 
that holds a DNS name in the SCN field and a matching IP 
address in the SAN-IP component, and is accessed via its 
DNS name (Table II ii). X.509 implies that such a 
certificate is valid, but RFCs 5280 and 6818 are silent about 
the validity of such a certificate. For this reason, the 
behaviour of web browsers is different: SA10, IE11 and 
ED38 consider it Valid and accept it, whereas GC55, FF50 
and OP42 consider it Invalid and issue a Warning message. 
This test case was not tested in 2009. 
It should be noted that the test case is legitimate. A web 
server, which uses the SCN field to hold the DNS name, 
may want to add its IP address to its PKC. The only suitable 
place is the IP component of the SAN. Except for this issue, 
our tests show a general improvement in the behaviour of 
web browsers as they are accepting (A) valid certificates, 
and refusing (W or R) invalid certificates.  
B. Key usage, extended key usage  
Key usage and extended key usage are used to 
determine the purpose of the public key contained in the 
PKC. A TLS server certificate could have a key usage 
extension or not. The standards [4][3] don’t constrain the 
authorities to issue TLS certificates with key usage 
extensions. 
1) What do the standards state about the Key Usage 
and Extended Key Usage extensions? 
The X.509 standard [3] states that if either the extended 
key usage or key usage extensions are recognized by the 
Relying Party then the PKC must be used just for the 
purposes indicated in it. The key usage and the extended 
key usage must be treated separately but they must have 
consistent values. If there is no purpose consistent with both 
fields, then the certificate shall not be used for any purpose 
[3].  
RFC 5280 states that the key usage extension, when it 
appears, should be a critical extension. For a TLS 
certificate, RFC 5280 recommends that the key usage, when 
it is defined, should have the value of “digital signature, key 
encipherment and/or key agreement” and the consistent 
value of the extended key usage should be “Server 
Authentication”.  
2) Tests and Results  
The value needed in the key usage extension depends on 
the encryption algorithms used for generating the 
certificate’s keys (RSA, DSA, DH, etc.) and on the cipher 
suite applied in the TLS communication between the client 
and the web server. A cipher suite consists of a key 
exchange scheme, a signature algorithm, a block cipher 
algorithm, and a hashing algorithm for computing the 
authentication key. They’re usually identified in a string [6]: 
[SSL/TLS]_[key exchange]_[signature algorithm]_ 
WITH_[block cipher]_[authentication hash] 
For example, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES256-
GCM_SHA384 is a cipher suite that implements Elliptic-
curve Diffie-Hellman Ephermal key exchange algorithm 
and uses the RSA algorithm as the signature algorithm with 
AES256 Galois/Counter Mode as the block cipher and 
SHA384 for the authentication hash. 
We generated our test certificates using the RSA 
algorithm. In this case, two types of cipher-suites are 
possible: 
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA*: in this case, the key 
exchange algorithm is ECDHE. This means that the 
RSA private key of the server’s certificate will be 
used for signing the ECDHE public key and the 
associated parameters [7, page 20]. The appropriate 
value of the key usage extension is 
digitalSignature. 
• Or TLS_RSA_*: in this case the key exchange 
algorithm is RSA. This means that the client will 
use the RSA public key of the server’s certificate 
for encrypting the random value chosen by the 
client (pre-master secret). The appropriate value of 
the key usage extension is keyEncipherment. 
Since RSA keys can lead to different key usages, we 
first check the cipher suites agreed between our web server 
and the web browsers by looking at the Hello server 
message in the TLS protocol. Table III shows all of them 
chose ECDHE for exchanging the key. Thus, the 
appropriate key usage value must be digitalSignature. 
We tested how the web browsers reacted when they 
validated a certificate, which conveyed an RSA public key 
and had a key usage value different from 
“digitalSignature”. It should be noted that the same results 
were obtained when the key usage was critical or not, which 
is correct. We chose wrong values “keyAgreement”, 
“dataEncipherment”, “keyEncipherment” and the correct 
value “digitalSignature” as test values for the key usage 
extension. The final column of Table IV indicates whether 
the certificate is valid or invalid according to the standards. 
3) Analysis of Results  
Here, the diversity of the web browsers’ behaviour is 
due to their inability to detect violations of the standards 
when the key usage extension contains wrong values. Most 
invalid PKCs were accepted by all the tested web browsers. 
However, in one positive case, FF50 rejected the server’s 
certificate when it contained the dataEncipherment value. 
This behaviour is an improvement over the behaviour of 
FF3 in 2009. However, FF50 and OP42 still accept invalid 
PKCs whose key usage extension is keyAgreement (KA) or 
keyEncipherment (KE). FF3 and OP9 behaved correctly in 
2009 and rejected these PKCs. Finally, as in 2009, IE11 
accepts certificates when the key usage has wrong values of 
dataEncryption (DE) or KA instead of Digital Signature 
(DS). It is quite appealing to observe that Table IV shows 
almost unanimous non-conformance against the standards.  
We cannot determine completely whether the non-
conformance of the web browsers is due to some 
compatibility issues or not.  
When the extended key usage has the wrong value of 
client authentication instead of server authentication, all 
web
TABLE III.  CHOSEN CIPHER SUITES 
 
 
TABLE IV.  KEY USAGE TEST 
 browsers reject the PKC. However, SA10 shows a warning 
message to the user instead of blocking access to the 
website. We are not convinced that SA10’s behaviour is 
very helpful, since this will invariably result in an invalid 
certificate being accepted by the user. The behaviour of 
FF50 is considered an improvement because in 2009 FF3 
accepted PKCs with this wrong value of the extended key 
usage extension.  
C. Revocation 
The primary objective of revocation is to remove an 
invalid certificate from circulation as quickly as possible. 
This is usually done by asking the RP to check the 
certificate’s status before accepting it.  
CAs can revoke a PKC by either publishing its serial 
number in a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) that can be 
downloaded from a repository, or by running a specialized 
server that can be accessed by the Online Certificate Status 
Protocol (OCSP) [8]. CrlDistributionPoints (CDP) and 
AuthorityInfoAccess (AIA) extensions are used to hold the 
CRL and the OCSP indicators respectively in a certificate.  
In general, most of the RP agreements state that RPs are 
responsible for taking the risk of using revoked certificates. 
As a result, RPs must be aware of the PKC’s status before 
using it in a transaction. 
In this study, we developed more advanced tests for the 
OCSP protocol. For this reason, we start by giving a brief 
description of it. The OCSP protocol is described in RFC 
6960 [8].  As shown in figure 4, when a web browser gets 
the server’s certificate, it retrieves the address of the OCSP 
server (responder) from the AIA extension. The browser 
formulates an OCSP request, which contains the ID of the 
server’s certificate. The browser may send the request using 
either the HTTP GET or POST methods. Upon receipt of 
the OCSP request, the OCSP server sends a signed response 
(in DER format) that contains the certificate ID and its 
status: 'good', 'revoked', or 'unknown'. It also contains 
thisUpdate and nextUpdate fields. The former is mandatory, 
the latter is optional. thisUpdate is used to represent the 
most recent time at which the responder knows the 
indicated status to have been correct [8]. nextUpdate  
represents the time at or before new information about the 
PKC’s status will be available.  
When the web browser receives an OCSP response, it 
can store it in a local cache for a period that corresponds to 
the time between the nextUpdate and thisUpdate fields [9]. 
Ideally, web browsers must verify the freshness of the 
OCSP response in order to avoid relying on out-of-date or 
replayed responses [9]. Two methods can be used to avoid 
this: adding nonces to the OCSP requests and responses, or 
verifying the time value in the thisUpdate field. In section 
C.2, we will see how the different web browsers handle the 
generation of OCSP requests, and the analysis of OCSP 
responses and their caching. 
 
Fig. 4. The OCSP protocol flow 
1) What do the standards state about the CRL 
Distribution Points and Authority Info Access Extensions?  
The X.509 standard states that the CDP extension can 
be, at the option of the certificate issuer, critical or not; but 
it recommends it to be non-critical for interoperability 
reasons. When it is a critical extension, a certificate-using 
system shall not use the PKC without first retrieving and 
checking the CRL [3]. However, when the extension is not 
critical a certificate-using system can use the PKC only if 
the revocation checking is not required by local policy or it 
is accomplished by other means [3]. According to RFC 
5280, the CDP and AIA extensions should be non-critical 
extensions, but it recommends supporting these extensions 
by CAs and applications [4].  
2) Tests and Results  
In the first experiment, we determined the approaches 
to revocation supported by each web browser, and if it is 
automatically configured or not (Table V i & ii). 
In the second experiment (Table V iii & iv), we show 
the reaction of web browsers when the OCSP server is 
down or when the CRL is not retrievable. 
In the third experiment (Table V v), we show the 
reaction of web browsers when they get an OCSP response 
indicating that the server’s certificate is revoked.  
In the fourth experiment (Table V vi), we show the 
HTTP methods supported by the web browsers. 
In the fifth experiment (Table V vii), we show which 
web browsers cache OCSP responses that indicate the PKC 
is revoked.  From this table, we can identify the browsers 
that use local caches for storing all types of OCSP 
responses (i.e. not only ‘revoked’ type responses).  
TABLE V.  REVOCATION TESTS 
 IE11 FF50 OP42 *ED38 *GC55 *SA10 





Supported Automatic Not Supported Automatic 





Supported Automatic Not Supported Automatic 
Where: Automatic means that the browser checks the certificate status automatically. Automatic,
configurable means that the browser checks the certificate status automatically, but the user can
disable this option. 





configurable N/A A N/A A 
iv)CRL is not 
retrieved 
A/W 
configurable N/A N/A A N/A A 
Where : N/A means not applicable. A means Accept. A/W configurable: means that the browser
accepts the certificate whose revocation status is not verified, but the user can activate an option to get
warned when the certificate status is not verified. A/R configurable similar to A/W configurable but
instead of showing a warning, the certificate is refused and the access is blocked. 
v)*Certificate is 
revoked in the 
OCSP response 
R R R_U R R_U W 
Where : R means that the browser rejects the certificate after receiving the OCSP response. R_U 
means that the browser rejects the certificate by reading its status from the cache of the underlying OS 
system. W means that the browser shows a warning message upon the reception of the OCSP 
response; the user has the possibility to get into the website.   
vi)*OCSP request 









Where : GET, POST, automatic  means that the browser uses by default the GET method to retrieve
the OCSP response, if the OCSP server doesn’t support the GET request, the browser will
automatically send a POST request.  POST automatic, GET manual means that the browser uses the
POST method by default, the user can activate the use of the GET method. However, the browser will
not use the POST method if the GET request fails. GET automatic means that the browser supports
only the GET method, if it fails the browser will not send a POST request. N/A means not applicable. 
vii)*Revocation 
response caching C DC N/A C N/A C 
Where :C means that the browser stores the OCSP response that indicates the revocation of a
certificate in a cache. DC means don’t cache . N/A means not applicable. 
viii)*cashing 
response when 
nextUpdate field is 
absent 
C DC N/A C N/A C 
Where :C means that the browser stores the OCSP response in a cache. DC means don’t cache . N/A
means not applicable. 
ix)*checking 
freshness of OCSP 
response 
DCF DCF N/A DCF N/A DCF 
Where :DCF means don’t check freshness. N/A means not applicable. 
 
In the sixth experiment (Table V viii), we show which web 
browsers will cache OCSP responses whose nextUpdate 
field is absent. 
Finally in the last experiment (Table V ix), we show 
whether web browsers verify the freshness of OCSP 
responses or not.  
3) Analysis of the results 
The inconsistency of the revocation processes comes 
from the different implementation efforts by the web 
browser manufacturers and not from that of the CAs 
suppliers.  
Maintaining a revocation service (either CRLs or 
OCSP) is a requirement for CAs. The standards [3][4] also 
recommend, but do not mandate, that RPs should ensure 
that the PKCs are not revoked before they rely on them. 
However, when the AIA and CDP extensions are present 
and understood, the RPs are required to process them. 
X.509 states about the CDP extension: “a certificate-using 
system shall not use the certificate without first retrieving 
and checking a CRL from one of the nominated distribution 
points” Therefore browsers should not ignore these 
extensions and they should fetch the revocation information 
and check it before accepting a certificate.  
There is some ambiguity over what should happen when 
a CA claims it maintains an OCSP service but does not. 
RFC 6960 [8] states “the OCSP client suspends acceptance 
of the certificate in question until the responder provides a 
response” and “In the event that the OCSP responder is 
operational but unable to return a status for the requested 
certificate, the "tryLater" response can be used to indicate 
that the service exists but is temporarily unable to 
respond.”. In the second experiment (Table V iii), the 
OCSP server was down and didn’t send any “tryLater” 
response. Thus, the reaction provided by the web browsers 
is not fully conformant as none of them block the access.  
Clearly, authorizing the access to a website whose 
certificate status is not verified compromises the security of 
web users.  In 2009, there were three different browser 
actions: IE7 authorized the access (soft-fail), whilst FF3 
blocked the access (hard-fail). OP9 authorized the access 
but removed the pad-lock icon and asked the user not to 
send sensitive information (soft hard-fail). Our tests in this 
paper show that today all the web browsers apply the 
principle of soft-fail. According to Adam Langley from 
Google [10], browsers went in this direction because they 
considered that hard-failing raises a different security issue 
by creating a single point of failure: if every web browser 
would hard-fail the connection, then OCSP servers would 
be the easiest target for DDOS attacks.  
Because soft-fail is the preferred action, Google has 
reached the conclusion that dynamic revocation checking is 
useless [10]. As a result, Google decided in 2012 to stop 
checking the status of non-ExtendedValidation (EV) 
certificates. Instead, Google invented a new revocation 
technology called CRLSets [11]. The basic idea of CRLSets 
is that Google merges all the CRLs of the existing CAs and 
reduces the obtained list by removing PKCs that it considers 
unimportant. The result is a minimal CRL list that is 
periodically pushed to Google Chrome. Opera seems to be 
following Google’s approach. The other web browsers 
(IE11, ED38, SA10 and FF50) still support OCSP and CRL 
checking (Table V i & ii).  
Curiously, when the Heartbleed bug was disclosed 
publically in April 2014 [12], millions of TLS certificates 
had to be revoked in a very short time. This event 
confirmed the limit of the traditional CRL revocation 
approach (in one case it was reported that a CRL file grew 
from 22 KB to 4.7 MB [13]). However, OCSP responders 
didn’t face any serious performance problems as a result of 
Heartbleed [14]. To cope with this issue, many advanced 
web users wanted to clean their revocation cache and to 
activate the hard-fail OCSP option. Google Chrome users 
were able to enable the revocation checking in their 
advanced settings but today, in the latest version of Chrome, 
this option has disappeared! So these users cannot hard-fail 
their connections because of Google’s approach. This 
shows the limits of CRLSets and highlights the need for a 
complete revocation checking mechanism. 
Whilst the OCSP validation process was not affected by 
the Heartbleed bug, nevertheless it has a performance 
overhead on TLS connections, since the PKC’s revocation 
status is checked each time in parallel with establishing the 
TLS connection. An OCSP exchange may take up to 350 
ms per HTTPS connection [15]. To improve OCSP 
performance web browser manufacturers have implemented 
several caching approaches. 
 
Fig. 5.  Comparison of Edge and Chrome for a revoked certificate 
Table V v) shows the reaction of web browsers when 
they are notified that a PKC is revoked, and Table V vii) 
their approach to caching. Under macOS Sierra, SA10 
checks for the status of the PKC and stores the result in the 
local cache (located at 
~/Library/Keychains/*/ocspcache.sqlite3). On Windows 10, 
there are two different caches. The first one is used by IE11 
and the second by ED38. Finally, Table V vii) shows that 
although GC55 and OP42 don’t directly check for the 
certificate status, they do read the local cache of the 
underlying OS system in order to inform the web user about 
the revocation. On Windows 10, GC55 reads the local cache 
of IE11, not that of ED38. Figure 5 shows how ED38 
indicates that a PKC has been revoked while GC55 tells the 
user that the connection is secure. 
The rest of our tests show that the three web browsers 
(IE11, ED38 and SA10) that support the OSCP mechanism 
with caching, still don’t respect the standards in some 
respects. For example, a web browser can cache the status 
checking response for a period between the thisUpdate and 
nextUpdate times. When an OCSP server sends an OCSP 
response without the nextUpdate field, the web browser 
should not cache the status response but must be reject it. 
RFC 5019 states: “Clients MUST check for the existence of 
the nextUpdate field and MUST ensure the current time, 
expressed in GMT time as described in Section 2.2.4, falls 
between the thisUpdate and nextUpdate times.  If the 
nextUpdate field is absent, the client MUST reject the 
response”. However, RFC 6960 states that “If nextUpdate is 
not set, the responder is indicating that newer revocation 
information is available all the time.”. This means that web 
browsers can accept the OCSP response but they must not 
cache it. This  inconsistency between the two standards 
comes from the fact that RFC 5019 is a profile of RFC 
6960. RFC 5019 appears more restrictive than RFC 6960 
about the presence of the nextUpdate field in the OCSP 
response. However, nothing prevents a web browser to 
adopt the liberal approach of RFC 6960 rather than the 
restrictive one of RFC 5019. It should be noted that in all 
cases the web browsers must not cache this type of OCSP 
response. Our test shows that IE11, ED38 and SA10 have 
stored the OCSP responses for a period up to 24h (Table V 
viii).  
Similarly, Table V ix) shows that these web browsers, as 
well as FF50, either don’t check the freshness of the OCSP 
responses, or assume that less than 1 day is fresh, when the 
nextUpdate field is absent. To prove this, we stored an 
OCSP response that indicates the certificate status as 
“Good” and later we revoked the certificate. Instead of 
sending the real response that comes from the OCSP server, 
we sent our stored OCSP response to the web browsers. 
IE11, ED38, FF50 and SA10 accepted our stale response for 
a period of up to 24h. It should be noted, that the hard-fail 
option of FF50 was set to true. The fact that FF50 didn’t 
show any error message means that it has accepted the 
OCSP response that we sent. For the other web browsers, 
the fact they cached our OCSP response means that they 
accepted it. 
RFC 6960 [8] requires web browsers to send OCSP 
requests using either the GET or POST methods. All the 
concerned web browsers respect this issue. However some 
OCSP servers may support only one OCSP request method 
(POST or GET), e.g. our OCSP test server only supported 
the POST method. Our tests show (Table V vi) that only 
IE11 and ED38 support the two methods. RFC 6960 [8] 
should clarify this issue. 
Recently, all the web browsers have introduced an 
additional approach for checking a PKC’s status, called 
OCSP stapling [16-18]. In OCSP stapling, CAs issue 
certificates with this new extension, which requires the web 
server to send a cached OCSP response in the TLS 
handshake. Web browsers should ensure this stapled OCSP 
response is present otherwise they should hard-fail the TLS 
connection. This approach offers three main advantages. 
First, it reduces the costs for the CAs because the number of 
OSCP request is significantly reduced, coming only from 
web sites. Secondly, it improves the privacy of web users 
because CAs can’t know the web sites users are visiting. 
Thirdly, it improves the performance of web browsers, as a 
second connection to an OCSP server does not need to be 
established. However, this solution doesn’t resolve the 
problem of a single point of failure and DDOS attacks 
mentioned by Google. An attacker can still attack the OCSP 
servers of a CA to prevent web servers from fetching new 
OCSP responses. As a consequence, access to these web 
sites would still be blocked if Must Staple is activated. This 
is why Google is continuing to not implement OCSP or the 
must-Staple option in Chrome. Netcraft state [14] that 
removing OSCP checking from Chrome provides Google 
with a performance advantage over the other web browsers 
like FF50 that do support it, but it is at the cost of leaving 
users in the dark about revoked non-EV certificates. 
From the web user’s point view, the current revocation 
practices are completely obscure. Many studies show that 
most web users don’t understand either what a PKC is or 
the role of a CA [1]. For those who do understand these 
things, they still cannot easily explain what is happening in 
some cases. For example, in order to understand the 
differences in the behaviour of SA10 and FF50 concerning 
the Compsac2017 revocation message, as described in the 
introduction, we had to setup a complex test environment 
and spend several hours understanding the finer details of 
the OCSP standard in order to explain the origin of the 
OCSP error message, which was OCSP_OLD_response. 
Our analysis is the following: the OCSP_OLD_response 
error message can be generated because of a problem with 
the local clock of either the web user (possibility1) or of the 
OCSP server (possibility2), or it can come from an attacker 
who tries to send an out of date response (i.e. replay attack) 
(possibility3).  After some investigation, it turned out that 
our machine was connected to a network time server of 
Apple, and for some reason, the access to  an Apple Time 
server was blocked by our network administrator. The 
reason why FF50 refused the connection and SA10 
accepted it, is that FF50 had been configured to Refuse 
whilst SA10 automatically Accepts bad OCSP responses 
(see Table V iii)). 
We believe that the revocation process of web browsers 
should be improved by: (1) Helping users to clearly see and 
have more control over the revocation process regardless of 
the approach used (OCSP, CRL, etc). Specifically, users 
should be able to change the process according to the 
context of use. E.g. if a web user connects to his/her bank, 
(s)he may need to activate the hard-fail option and obtain 
the freshest verification; but if (s)he connects to a TV 
server, (s)he might tolerate a soft-fail option and a stale 
verification. Today, none of the web browsers consider such 
a need.  (2) Giving users the ability to easily flush their 
OCSP/CRL caches.  E.g, on 13 October 2016, GlobalSign 
wrongly revoked an intermediate CA certificate [21].  Many 
web users had this bad response in their caches and as a 
result, access to different web sites was suddenly blocked. 
Globalsign issued guidelines to help web users clean their 
caches in order to obtain a fresh response, but this guide 
was not complete - it didn’t include ED38. 
IV. CONCLUSION  
Our tests show that considerable changes in the 
validation process of web browsers have been observed. 
However, their behaviour is still inconsistent. Some 
behaviour is dangerous for web users. For example, our test 
cases show that SA10 always shows a warning message 
regardless of the seriousness of the certificate validation 
error. Even when a server’s certificate is revoked, the web 
user has the possibility of proceeding to the web site. 
Clearly, the inconsistency of web browsers regarding 
PKC validation confuses web users. The reasons behind the 
inconsistent behaviour are: (1) Standards are complex, 
vague and allow different implementations for different 
contexts of use. (2) There are a multitude of standards (∼50) 
that handle validation issues. (3) There appears to be no real 
coordination between the web browser suppliers regarding 
the PKC validation process, specifically:  
a. Web browsers have different styles of validation 
warning messages.  
b. Web browsers have different trust admission 
policies for CAs.  
c. Web browsers handle the ambiguity in the 
standards differently. 
d.  Web browsers offer users different 
preferences/settings related to the validation 
process. For example, users of FF50 have the 
choice to de/activate the OCSP hard fail, OCSP 
stapling, and OCSP must stable options. The same 
options are not present on SA10 and IE11.  
We believe that web browser implementers still have 
some way to go before their implementations consistently 
implement the X.509 standards in a user friendly way.  
Disambiguating standards or introducing another standard 
won’t solve these issues. As mentioned before, the 
standards give only guidance on whether a certificate is 
invalid or not, but will not advise an RP what to do with it. 
Having an advisory authority for the browser industry 
would help to improve the consistency of PKC validation 
by web browsers. We believe that the CAB-forum is the 
right place to handle PKC validation issues. Today, the 
main focus of the CAB-forum is the issuance of certificates 
rather than their validation. Extending the scope of the 
CAB-forum to consider validation issues would have a 
positive impact on web users. Ideally consistency should 
not only be applied to browser certificate validation, but 
also to browser configuration, PKI error messages and 
processes and procedures. Through the CAB-forum, web 
browser suppliers could coordinate more effectively and 
avoid taking individual initiatives. For instance, the decision 
made by Google to abandon the verification of certificates’ 
status in Chrome without any coordination with the other 
web browser suppliers has only served to increase 
confusion in the Web TLS system. Paradoxically, Google 
has launched a new PKI trust service [22] in which one of 
the user’s/RPs’ obligations is: “(c) checking Certificate 
status, and the validity of all Certificates in the applicable 
Certificates chain, before you rely on a given Certificate”.  
If only Google would apply this obligation to Chrome! 
Finally, we believe that Web browsers must assume the 
responsibility of their actions vis-à-vis RPs. Since the 
creation of the SSL protocol, the exact role of a web 
browser in the validation process has never been clearly 
defined. The Web PKI industry has defined the obligations 
of PKIs, certificate holders (i.e. web servers’ owners) and 
RPs (meaning web users), but not of web browsers. Their 
role in PKC validation is very important because they are 
the entities that control the whole validation process on 
behalf of the users. Specifically, they are the entities that 
include the trusted CAs in the users’ platforms, they 
validate the certificate fields on users’ behalf, but they are 
the only entities that have nothing to lose if revoked 
certificates are accepted. What will happen if a web user is 
connected automatically by a web browser to a fraudulent 
website whose certificate has been revoked? The web 
browser vendor’s response will be to admit no liability. The 
web user may lose his/her sensitive information, or 
download malware, and at the same time, (s)he cannot seek 
compensation from the relevant PKI nor the web domain 
owner because the former has respected its obligations to 
indicate the revocation of the certificate, and the latter 
probably cannot be located. A possible solution to this 
problem is to adopt the new 4-cronered-trust model that was 
recently published in the X.509 (2016) standard [23]. 
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